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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (3) (j) , Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended) . The case has been assigned to the Court of 
Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether or not the Trial Court erred in failing to 
award attorney's fees to the plaintiff as the prevailing 
party in the action, even though the plaintiff prevailed on 
all of the defendants' counterclaims and received a net 
judgment on the plaintiff's claims. [R: 1099-1101, 1629-34, 
1724-44, 1803-14.] A party who obtained a net judgment is 
the prevailing party. Hines v. Perez, 242 F.2d 459 (CA9 
1959) (Plaintiff was prevailing party even when not 
prevailing on all its claims.) Trollope v. Koerner, 515 P.2d 
340 (Ariz. App 1973) (Held error for failing to award costs 
to landlord with net recovery as x'prevailing party", even 
though both parties prevailed on some of their claims.) A 
party who prevails in dismissing claims against it is also 
the prevailing party. Zenith Ins. Co. v. Breslaw, 108 F.3d 
l 
205 (CA9 1997). Where one party has prevailed on all claims 
in an action, the identity of the prevailing party is an 
issue of law. See Stitching Mayflower v. Newpark Resources, 
917 F.2d 1239, 1248 FN. 9 (10th Cir. 1990). With respect to 
an appeal which presents only questions of law, a Trial 
Court's ruling are accorded no deference in their review for 
correctness. Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City, 752 
P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988). 
2. Whether or not the Trial Court erred in receiving 
and considering evidence which contradicted the express 
terms of a lease agreement containing an integration clause. 
[R: 1724-44, 1803-14, 1847: pp. 68:10-72:13, 98:18-99:7, 
245:4-14, 253:10-11, 264:24-265:3, 294:12-14, 299:9-13, 
304:20-23, 1848: pp. 539:7-542:17, Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 
and 2.1] Wade v. Job, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991). 
(Parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict the express 
provisions of a lease stating the premises are in a clean 
condition and in a state of good repair) . In reviewing 
1
 Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 was Requests for Admissions with the two lease agreements attached. Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 
was defendants' responses admitting the authenticity of the agreements. [R: 1847: p 22:11-22, 23:7-8.] The Lease 
Agreements are attached hereto as Exhibits "E" and "F." 
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questions regarding the admissibility of evidence, the 
Appellate Court applied a correction of error standard. When 
error is found, reversal is appropriate if, after review of 
all the evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood that a 
different result would have been reached. Utah Dept. Transp. 
v. 6200 South Assoc, 872 P.2d 462, 465 (Utah App. 1994) . 
3. Whether or not the Trial Court erred in awarding 
an equitable offset to defendants, relieving them from their 
contractual obligation to pay their last month of rent, 
where the defendants had chosen to live in premises that the 
Trial Court determined were uncomfortable for a period of 23 
months pursuant to the terms of a lease agreement which 
expressly provided for responsibilities of the parties 
concerning the condition of the premises. [R: 1629-34, 1724-
44, 1803-14, 1848: pp. 565:17-24, 567:13-22.] American 
Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 
(Utah 1996) (Equitable relief not available in an action at 
law); UTCO Assoc, Ltd. v. Zimmerman, 27 P.3d 177, 180 (Utah 
App. 2 001) (Law will not apply equitable remedy where there 
is an adequate remedy at law) ; Battistone v. American Land 
3 
and Dev. Co. , 607 P. 2d 837 (Utah 1980) (Equity cannot be 
used to extricate someone from circumstances they created.) 
With respect to an appeal which presents only questions of 
law, a Trial Court's ruling are accorded no deference in 
their review for correctness. Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt 
Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988). 
4. Whether or not the Trial Court erred in awarding 
defendants damages as an offset to their obligation to pay 
rent after the Trial Court dismissed all of the defendants7 
counterclaims on a motion for summary judgment for the 
defendant's failure to comply with the statutory 
requirements of Utah Code Ann., Section 57-22-1, et seq. [R: 
1099-1101, 1724-44, 1803-14, 1848: pp. 560:1-21.] Whether 
the defendants were entitled to make a claim for damages was 
governed by statute. Utah Code Ann., Section 57-22-1, et 
seq. With respect to an appeal which presents only questions 
of law, a Trial Court's ruling are accorded no deference in 
their review for correctness. Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt 
Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988). 
4 
5. Whether or not the Trial Court erred in denying 
plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment or For a 
New Trial, under circumstances in which the improper 
admission of parol evidence and other irrelevant testimony 
created a bias against the plaintiff which adversely 
affected the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff. [R: 
1722-50, 1803-14, 1817-19.] Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 59(a)(1), (5) and (6). A Trial Court has broad 
discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for 
new trial, and will not be overturned absent a clear abuse 
of discretion. Goddard v. Hideman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 
1984) . To support a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, 
the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in 
support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict. McCorvey v. State Dept. of 
Transp., 568 P.2d 41, 44 (Utah 1993). 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d)(1). 
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Rule 54(d)(1). Costs. 
(d) (1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision 
therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in 
these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; 
provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for 
review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in 
connection with such appeal or other proceeding for review, 
shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs 
against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall 
be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The above-captioned action was filed by plaintiff 
Geralynn Myrah on October 27, 2000. The plaintiff claimed 
damages for unpaid rent and repair and cleaning of premises 
occupied by the defendants for a period of 23 months. [R: 1-
10.] 
The defendants filed various counterclaims, but all of 
those counterclaims were dismissed on plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on April 2, 2001. [R: 1099-1101.] 
Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as 
to plaintiff's claims. Her Motion for Summary Judgment was 
granted in part by the Order dated September 2, 2 0 03. [R: 
1099-1101.] The matter went before the Trial Court as a 
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bench trial on April 28, 2005, and May 10, 2005. [R: 1847: 
p. 1, 1848: p. 324.] On June 7, 2005, the Trial Court signed 
Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Judgment awarding 
damages to the plaintiff in the principal amount of $207. 
[R: 162 9-34.] However, the Trial Court ruled that there was 
no prevailing party in the action and refused to award the 
costs or attorney's fees associated with the case. [R: 1629-
34, 1848: pp. 567:23-568:1.] 
The parties each filed post judgment motions. The 
parties post judgment motions were denied by the Trial 
Court's Order dated July 14, 2005. [R: 1817-19.] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts relevant to the determination of the matter 
are the following: 
On June 10, 1998, plaintiff entered into a Rental 
Agreement with the defendants for a one-year term. [R: 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2.] Effective June 1, 1999, the 
parties entered into a second lease for a one-year term. [R: 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2.] After the defendants vacated 
the premises at the end of the second lease, the landlord 
7 
brought the above-captioned action against the tenant for 
amounts due under the Renewal Agreement. [R: 1-10.] 
Defendants filed a counterclaim, but all of the defendants7 
counterclaims were dismissed on summary judgment. [R: 1099-
1101.] 
The Trial Court awarded damages to the landlord at 
trial. Damages awarded consisted of $85.00 of unpaid rent 
and late fees for the month of April 2000; unpaid utility 
charges of $122.37 from July 20, 2000; and prejudgment 
interest of $98.50. [R: 1629-34, 1848: pp. 564:8-13, 565:16-
17.] In addition to the foregoing, plaintiff claimed that 
she was entitled to rent for the month of June 2 000 in the 
amount of $1,095.00, together with a late fee of $54.75, and 
damages associated with cleaning and repairing the property 
after the defendants left the premises in poor condition. 
The cleaning and repair expenses awarded were offset by the 
security deposit, and the Trial Court forgave the June rent 
and late fees. [R: 1629-34, 1848: pp. 564:14-23, 565:17-
567:22.] 
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The Renewal Agreement between the parties provided for 
both the June rent and the June late fee, based on the term 
of the lease. With regard to the condition of the premises, 
both the original Rental Agreement and the subsequent 
Renewal Agreement signed by the defendants expressly stated 
that the tenant had examined the premises, was satisfied 
with their physical condition and that his taking of 
possession was conclusive evidence that the premises had 
been received in good order and repair. [R: Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 1 and 2.] The tenant further covenanted as a 
provision of the Renewal Agreement to be responsible for 
maintaining the premises in clean and satisfactory condition 
and repair. Both the Rental Agreement and the Renewal 
Agreement also contained an integration clause. 
The Trial Court ruled that the Parol Evidence Rule 
precluded introduction of evidence contradicting the express 
terms of the leases concerning the good and clean condition 
of the premises. [R: 1848: p. 563:18-25.] The Trial Court 
nonetheless received a great deal of testimony to the effect 
that the premises were not in a good and clean condition 
9 
over the objection of plaintiff. [R: 1847 pp. 68:10-72:13, 
98:18-99:17, 245:4-14, 253:10-11, 264:24-265:3, 294:12-14, 
299:9-13, 304:20-23, 1848: pp. 539:7-542:17.] Over the 
objection of plaintiff, the Trial Court also received 
testimony concerning the condition of the premises during 
periods of time months and years prior to the occupation of 
the premises by the defendants. [R: 1847: pp. 250:11-251:9, 
258:10-259:2, 299:4-13, 305:20-317:10.] Based on the 
testimony received, the Trial Court determined that the 
premises may have been uncomfortable, but that the issues 
with the premises did not rise to a level of unhabitability. 
[R: 1629-34, 1848: pp. 562:13-563:17, 564:24-565:7.] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff was the prevailing party on all of the 
defendants' counterclaims, which were dismissed on 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. In addition, 
plaintiff prevailed on her claims and was awarded a judgment 
in the principal amount of $207. Therefore, plaintiff was 
the prevailing party as a matter of law. Plaintiff should 
have been awarded her costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 
10 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d) and pursuant to 
the express terms of the relevant Renewal Agreement between 
the parties. 
The damages awarded to the plaintiff should also be 
increased in the principal amount of $1,149.75 relative to 
the rent and late fee due for June 2000. It is undisputed 
that the rent and the late fee were due. The Trial Court 
inappropriately awarded an equitable offset to the 
defendants, contrary to the law. There were no counterclaims 
pursuant to which an equitable offset could have been 
awarded. The Trial Court's own summary judgment ruling and 
order precluded such a claim. Moreover, principles of equity 
did not allow the Judge to make an equitable award to the 
defendants. The equitable offset resulted from two improper 
motivations. First, bias was created by the Trial Court's 
improper admission of evidence. Second, the Trial Court 
awarded the equitable offset primarily as justification for 
its determination that there was no prevailing party so that 
the Trial Court would not be required to deal with the 
11 
attorney's fees owing to the plaintiff as the prevailing 
party. 
The damages awarded to the plaintiff should also be 
increased for cleaning and repairs. Evidence of such expense 
was properly introduced at trial. The express terms of the 
two written lease agreements between the parties stated that 
the property was in good clean condition at the outset of 
the lease and at the time of renewal. It was the 
responsibility of the tenant to maintain the premises in 
good clean condition. The original Rental Agreement and the 
Renewal Agreement both contained an integration clause, and 
the parol evidence rule precluded the introduction of 
evidence to the effect that the premises were not in good 
clean condition at the outset of each lease term. The Trial 
Court committed reversible error in admitting and giving 
weight to parol evidence that contradicted the express terms 
of such agreements. The Trial Court also erred in 
considering testimony from third parties about the 
conditions of the premises as much as two years prior to the 
occupation by the defendants in arriving at its decision 
12 
concerning the appropriate amount of damages relative to the 
cleaning and repair of the premises following the 
defendants' departure. 
ARGUMENT 
I, PLAINTIFF IS THE PREVAILING PARTY AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiff is entitled to her costs and attorney's fees 
pursuant to paragraph no. 11 of the Renewal Agreement. [R: 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2.] 
It was an error in law to find that there was no 
prevailing party in the action, where the plaintiff was 
awarded damages in the principal amount of $207.00 and where 
the plaintiff prevailed in the dismissal of all the 
defendants' counterclaims on a motion for summary judgment. 
As a matter of law, plaintiff is the prevailing party 
in the action. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d); 
See Hines v. Perez, 242 F.2d 459 (CA9 1959) (Plaintiff was 
prevailing party even when not prevailing on all its 
claims.) Trollope v. Koerner, 515 P.2d 340 (Ariz. App 1973) 
(Held error for failing to award costs to landlord with net 
recovery as x'prevailing party'', even though both parties 
13 
prevailed on some of their claims.) The contract expressly 
requires that plaintiff be awarded her attorney's fees as 
the prevailing party. [R: 1099-1101, 1629-34, 1848: pp. 
546:21-547:2.] 
Plaintiff is also the prevailing party with respect to 
each of the defendants7 claims. Zenith Ins. Co. v. Breslaw, 
108 F.3d 205 (CA9 1997) (Party prevailing in dismissal of 
all claims against it is prevailing party.) Based on the 
dismissal of the defendants' counterclaims on the motion for 
summary judgment, the plaintiff was the prevailing party on 
all of those counterclaims. [R: Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 
2.] 
II. IMPROPER INTRODUCTION OF PAROL EVIDENCE WAS REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
As set forth in the Findings of Fact, paragraph nos. 1 
and 2, based on the Requests for Admissions, the Trial Court 
found that the original Lease Agreement and the Renewal 
Agreement consisted of two written documents. [R: 1847: pp. 
22:11-22, 23:7-8, 1848: pp. 563:18-564:7, Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 1 and 2.] Paragraph no. 11 of the Rental Agreement 
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and paragraph no. 13 of the Renewal Agreement contained an 
integration clause. [R: Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2.] 
Paragraph no. 5 of the Rental Agreement and paragraph no. 7 
of the Renewal Agreement stated that the defendants had 
examined the premises and that they were in good order and 
repair at the commencement of each agreement. [R: 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2.] Moreover, at the time that 
the Renewal Agreement was signed, the defendants had resided 
in the premises for a period of nearly one year. Paragraph 
nos. 5 and 9 of the Rental Agreement and paragraph nos.2,4 
and 7 of the Renewal Agreement provide that it is the 
responsibility of the tenant to maintain the premises in 
good repair and in a clean condition. [R: Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 1 and 2.] 
From the outset of the trial, defendants sought to 
introduce evidence that contradicted the express provisions 
of the lease, which stated that the property was in a state 
of good repair and clean condition acceptable to the 
defendants. Plaintiff objected throughout the trial that all 
such testimony and exhibits constituted inadmissible parol 
15 
evidence being introduced for the sole purpose of 
contradicting the express terms of the lease. [R: 1847: pp. 
68:10-72:13, 98:18-99:7, 245:4-14, 253:10-11, 264:24-265:3, 
294:12-14, 299:9-13, 304:20-23, 1848: pp. 539:7-542:17.] In 
each instance, the Trial Court ruled that it would receive 
the testimony and documents into evidence notwithstanding 
said objections, but reserved to plaintiff the right to make 
a motion to strike all such evidence if such evidence did 
not demonstrate that the premises were actually unhabitable. 
[R: 1847: pp. 72:9-13, 98:18-99:7.] At the end of the 
presentation of evidence, plaintiff made such a motion, but 
the motion was denied by the Trial Court. [R: 1848: pp. 
539:7-542:17.] 
The Trial Court found, as provided by paragraph no. 12 
of the findings of fact, that the premises were habitable. 
[R: 1629-34, 1848: pp. 562:13-563:17, 564:24-565:7.] The 
Trial Court expressly stated that the condition of the 
premises was neither immaculate nor unsuitable for human 
habitation, but something in between. The Trial Court found 
that the condition of the premises did not threaten human 
16 
safety, but was merely uncomfortable or inconvenient at 
times during the lease. [R: 1629-34, 1848: pp. 562:13-
563:17, 564:24-565:7.] The Supreme Court stated in Wade v. 
Job, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991) that public policy 
grounds concerned the issue of habitability and safety, and 
that such grounds could not be used to invalidate lease 
provisions that did not threaten human safety. As Justice 
Howe pointed out in his concurring opinion in Wade v. Job, 
Supra, at 1018, the Utah Fit Premises Act was adopted in 
1990, after the action arose in that case. Therefore, in 
cases arising after the Utah Fit Premises Act was adopted in 
1990, tenants are also required to comply with the statutory 
mandates of Section 57-22-1, et seq. with regard to any 
complaint they may have concerning the condition of 
property. 
During the course of the trial, defendants also sought 
to introduce repeatedly testimony concerning the condition 
of the premises during time periods that were not relevant. 
In each instance, plaintiff objected to such evidence on the 
additional grounds of relevancy. [R: 1847: pp. 250:11-251:9, 
17 
258:10-259:2, 299:4-13, 305:20-317:10.] As with regard to 
the objection concerning inadmissible parol evidence, 
discussed above, the Trial Court provisionally overruled the 
objection, stating that it would entertain a motion to 
strike such evidence at the end of the trial, thereby 
reserving the question of relevancy until after it had 
received all of such evidence. [R: 1847: pp. 72:9-13, 98:18-
99:7.] The only relevant time periods with regard to 
plaintiff's complaint were the months of April, 2000 and 
June, 2000. These were the only time periods for which the 
plaintiff was seeking to collect rent. All of the 
counterclaims by the defendants were previously dismissed by 
the Trial Court on the plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment, pursuant to the Trial Court's memorandum decision 
dated May 23, 2003 and the subsequent order, dated September 
2, 2003. [R: 1099-1101.] At the end of presentation of 
evidence, as noted above, plaintiff made the appropriate 
motion to strike and the motion was denied by the Trial 
Court. [R: 1848: pp. 539:7-542:17.] 
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As a result of the Trial Court's rulings, a large 
volume of testimony was introduced and given inappropriate 
weight by the Trial Court that was both irrelevant to 
plaintiff's claims and inadmissible parol evidence 
concerning the condition of the premises. The introduction 
of that evidence created a bias on the part of the Trial 
Court which led the Trial Court to relieve the defendants 
from their legal duty to pay rent and late fees for the 
month of June 2 00 0 based on the terms of the contract, based 
on the Trial Court's decision in equity that the condition 
of the premises was uncomfortable for the defendants or 
inconvenient. Such a finding was the result of bias in the 
perception of the property that was created by a very large 
volume of irrelevant and otherwise inadmissible evidence 
which directly contradicted the express provisions of the 
lease. 
The bias created during the course of the trial that 
the premises were in an inconvenient or uncomfortable 
condition for a period of 23 months also impacted the award 
of damages associated with cleaning and repairs to the 
19 
property. The Trial Court stated that it did not believe 
that the plaintiff had spent the amount of time cleaning the 
property which she testified she had spent, and made a 
reduction in the award of cleaning damages as a result. [R: 
1848: pp. 565:24-566:7.] Mrs. Myrah also testified about the 
repairs made by Gus Dixon and defendants' extensively cross 
examined Mrs. Myrah about the repairs to the drywall, 
repairs to the master bath door, repairs to the sprinkler 
system, repairs to the kitchen drawers and fixtures, 
painting inside and out, and all of the other repairs that 
were detailed in the invoice from Gus Dixon to Ms. Myrah 
which she paid; and she testified that the repairs were 
actually completed and that they were associated with the 
defendants' occupation of the premises. [R: 1847: 38:23-
39:13, 40:4-41:17, 45:10-25, 47:3-49:13, 58:19-59:6, 60:16-
25, 178:4-179:4, 180:2-19, 184:6-25, 185:24-186:10, 187:6-
190:12, Plaintiff's Exhibit 6.] The Trial Court disregarded 
the plaintiff's testimony concerning, not the amount of the 
payment she made to Gus Dixon, but her testimony and 
description of the repairs that Gus Dixon had performed. [R: 
20 
1848: p. 564:14-23.] The Trial Court held that there was no 
foundation for the conclusion that any of the repairs made 
by Gus Dixon were reasonably related to the damages caused 
by the defendants. Defendant Klaus Campbell admitted that he 
damaged the linoleum when moving the refrigerator. [R: 1847: 
p. 206:6-24, 1848: p. 363:6-24.] The testimony concerning 
the cost to replace the linoleum was $2,200.00. [R: 1847: 
pp. 61:17-62:20, 1848: p. 570:1-5.] With respect to damage 
to linoleum, the Trial Court made no award of damages, 
opting instead to give general wear-and-tear award of 
damages in the amount of $267.86. The bias of the Trial 
Court created by the improper admission of evidence directly 
impacted the damages rulings made by the Trial Court. 
The appropriate action to be taken at this stage is for 
a new trial to be ordered. Trial in this matter was 
originally scheduled to take a single day. But for the 
improper admission of evidence, the trial would have been 
completed within one day. A new trial, with the evidence 
appropriately limited, would be completed within one day. 
21 
Alternatively, this Court may direct the Trial Court to 
amend the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment 
in this case as appropriate without a new trial. In either 
event, a new trial or amendment of the findings and 
conclusions is appropriate. 
Ill, EQUITY CANNOT BE DONE IN VIOLATION OF EXPRESS 
CONTRACTUAL TERMS, 
It was an error in law for the Trial Court to forgive 
the Campbells from responsibility to pay rent and late fees 
for the month of June 2000 on the basis that the defendants 
had lived in premises that were both inconvenient or 
uncomfortable for 2 3 months. 
With regard to the issue of equitably excusing 
defendants from payment of their contractual rental 
obligations, doing so constitutes an error of law by the 
Trial Court. In the first place, the Court of Appeals in 
Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 98 (Utah App. 1994) 
held that when a party accepted performance of the contract 
by the other party, that acceptance constituted a waiver of 
any rights that the accepting party had to thereafter claim 
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a defect in performance. In the present case, it was 
undisputed that the defendants accepted the premises by 
their' execution of the original Rental Agreement. [R: 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2.] A year later, the defendants 
again signed an agreement expressly accepting the premises 
as set forth in the Renewal Agreement. [R: Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 1 and 2; 1848: pp. 364:25-365:2, 401:18-403:10.] 
Defendants further accepted the premises by their decision 
to live in the property for the entire 23 months in 
question. [R: 1848: pp. 401:18-402:4, 514:6-21.] Having 
failed to make an appropriate identification of any defect 
with the premises before accepting the premises, they have 
no legal basis upon which to claim the rebate that was 
gratuitously awarded by the Trial Court. 
Second, even if the actions of the defendants did not 
constitute a legally enforceable waiver as discussed above, 
the Court in Kodiak Elec. Assn. v. Deleval Turbine, Inc. 6 94 
P.2d 150 (AK 1984) held that equitable defenses, such as the 
defense of laches, is not available in an action at law. In 
other words, where the lawsuit in this case involved the 
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contractual obligations of the defendants to pay rent, the 
Court does not have the legal authority to grant equitable 
relief to those legal obligations under the circumstances. 
The Kodiak Court stated that in reviewing the law in other 
jurisdictions, they found that nearly all jurisdictions 
preclude equitable defenses on the same basis. Utah follows 
the same precedent. The leading case on the subject is 
American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 93 0 
P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996). See also UTCO Assoc, Ltd. v. 
Zimmerman, 27 P.3d 177, 180 (Utah App. 2001) (Law will not 
apply equitable remedy where there is an adequate remedy at 
law); Battistone v. American Land and Dev. Co., 607 P.2d 837 
(Utah 1980) (Equity cannot be used to extricate someone from 
circumstances they created.) In the present case, the 
obligations between the parties are established by the 
written contract between the parties. [R: Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 1 and 2.] Since the relationship is governed by a 
contract, and since it is the terms of the contract which is 
the subject of the trial and not some separate tort claim, 
equitable remedies cannot be made available to the 
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defendants to relieve them from their legal obligations. 
Moreover, because the defendants themselves are responsible 
for the creation of these legal obligations and 
circumstances, they cannot request the application of equity 
to relieve them therefrom, particularly where they did not 
avail themselves of any of the legal remedies available to 
them during the relevant time period. There are principles 
of equity too numerous to detail in this brief for why 
defendants are not entitled to equitable relief. 
In fact, as a matter of law, the Trial Court dismissed 
all of the counterclaims filed by the defendants. [R: 1099-
1101.] The right to the equitable relief awarded by the 
Court at trial was not even pleaded by the defendants, 
except to the extent that the defendants' claims were 
already dismissed by the Trial Court as a matter of law. 
Utah Code Ann. , Section 57-22-1 et seq. The Utah Fit 
Premises Acts, contains the requirements with which tenants 
must comply if they have complaints concerning the condition 
of the premises they occupy. [R: 462-468.] The Trial Court 
ruled on summary judgment that the defendants did not comply 
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with those provisions. [R: 1099-1101.] Therefore, the 
defendants as tenants have no right to complain about the 
condition of the property or seek redress as to any aspect 
of the condition of the property during the period of their 
tenancy. 
The defendants testified that they understood the terms 
of the lease, in the first place. They cannot claim that 
having understood the lease, they did not understand the 
express provisions of paragraph no. 3 of the Renewal 
Agreement which stated that they had the right to terminate 
the lease on 3 0 days notice by complying with the provisions 
for termination. [R: 1848: pp. 489:1-491:9, Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 1 and 2.] They chose to stay in the premises, 
rather than exercise that right. It does not do equity to 
allow them a rebate in the rent they paid, when they 
exercised their option to remain at the premises as long as 
they did. Likewise, the defendants had the responsibility 
under the terms of the lease to clean the premises. [R: 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2.] The fact that they chose not 
to keep their house clean does not entitle them to any 
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rebate as a matter of equity. Plaintiff did not have the 
ability to' do the housecleaning for the defendants during 
the course of their tenancy. She did the best that she could 
for them at the time she offered them a Renewal Agreement by 
expressly authorizing a reduction of $50 per month to allow 
her tenants to actually spend money making repairs to the 
premises if any were needed. [R: Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 
2.] When the defendants themselves chose not to take 
advantage of that opportunity, how can the Trial Court 
justify giving them a rebate that they did not even accept 
when it was offered to them during the tenancy? The decision 
by the Trial Court was patently unfair to Mrs. Myrah, who 
had relied upon the express terms of the rental agreements. 
IV. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY REDUCTION OF 
THE DAMAGES AWARDED. 
With regard to the finding that the damage to the 
property caused by defendants totaled only $1,100.00, there 
was an insufficiency of evidence to justify the verdict in 
question. When only admissible evidence is considered, then 
the Trial Court must conclude that the premises were clean 
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and in a condition of good repair at the time they were 
delivered to the defendants. Paragraph no. 5 of the original 
Rental Agreement, and paragraph no. 7 of the Renewal 
Agreement signed eleven months later both expressly stated 
as follows: 
5. TENANT has examined the premises and is satisfied 
with the physical condition thereof, and his/her taking 
possession is conclusive evidence of receipt of 
premises in good order and repair. Any exceptions to 
this statement are noted below. 
TENANT agrees to keep said premises in clean and 
satisfactory condition. TENANT agrees to clean and 
repair any damage upon vacating the premises. The 
security deposit will be refunded within 14 days of 
final inspection, provided that the TENANT stays six 
(6) months or longer, thirty (30) days written notice 
is received prior to vacating, premises are clean and 
in good condition, rent due is paid in full, and final 
payments are made on all utilities. 
7. CONDITION, MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS: RESIDENT has 
examined the premises and is satisfied with the 
physical condition thereof. His/her taking possession 
is conclusive evidence of receipt of premises in good 
order and repair, with any exceptions to this statement 
noted below. 
RESIDENT agrees to keep said premises in clean and 
satisfactory condition. RESIDENT shall maintain both 
inside and outside of the premises in a clean and 
orderly fashion: free of trash and debris, and lawns 
watered and mowed. RESIDENT will not keep and 
inoperable vehicles on the grounds. 
28 
[R: Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2.] 
On cross examination, the plaintiff testified about the 
week she spent cleaning and preparing the property before 
the defendants moved in, as well as repairs made to the 
property by contractors. [R: 1847: pp. 94:14-98:13, 99:13-
100:6, 103:16-104:1, 113:18-114:19, 115:16-116:21, 118:3-
119:11.] On rebuttal, Mary Sonne also testified as to the 
time and effort expending by the plaintiff in preparing the 
property, as well as her own inspection of the premises at 
the end of that week of cleaning and repair. [R: 1848: pp. 
517:18-521:9.] Mary Sonne testified that the premises were 
in immaculate condition. [R: 1848: pp. 534:22-535:8.] 
For purposes of marshalling the evidence, this Court 
must examine the testimony of Carter Hill, Bonnie Sackett, 
Shane Dagnon, Klaus Campbell and Shannon Campbell. [R: 1847: 
pp. 241-319, 1848: pp. 335-515.] Carter Hill testified 
concerning the condition of the property more than one year 
previous to the occupation by the defendants. [R: 1847: pp. 
299:4-12, 317:1-10.] His testimony concerned a list of items 
that were not in good condition during the term of his 
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lease. [R: Defendants' Exhibit 38; 1847: pp. 305:20-317:10.] 
However, the prior condition of the premises does not tend 
to show the condition during the relevant time period, and 
such evidence is precluded by the parol evidence rule. 
Bonnie Sackett testified that she actually entered the 
premises was the day after the previous tenant had vacated, 
before the mess left by the previous tenant had been cleaned 
up. [R: 1847: pp. 250:11-251:9, 258:10-259:2.] She testified 
that she had no other knowledge concerning the interior 
condition of the home. Thereafter, she was only able to 
testify concerning observations about the exterior of the 
home. [R: 1847: pp. 243:23-247:10, 252:7-13.] Thus, her 
testimony is also irrelevant as predating the occupation by 
the defendants and excluded by the parol evidence rule. 
The testimony of Shane Dagnon concerned the condition 
of the property on the day that the Campbells moved into the 
property. [R: 1847: pp. 264:14-265:3, 267:22-277:4.] Again, 
such testimony was inadmissible parol evidence to the extent 
that he testified the property was not clean or that the 
condition of the property was not in good repair. The Court 
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made an express finding the premises were not unhabitable. 
[R: 1629-34, 1848: pp. 562:13-563:17, 564:24-565:7.] 
Therefore, pursuant to the holding in Wade v. Job, 818 P.2d 
1006, 1010 (Utah 1991), the express provisions of the lease 
prohibit introduction of parol evidence in support of an 
assertion that the property was unclean or not in a 
condition of good repair. 
Klaus Campbell and Shannon Campbell were also allowed 
to testify that the premises were not clean and in good 
repair on the date that they moved in. [R: 1848: pp. 352:19-
360:12, 362:14-363:2, 433:16-437:13, 441:3-442:22, 456:6-
457:11, 459:1-461:7, 462:10-21, 511:13-14.] However, Klaus 
Campbell had inspected the premises personally before 
signing the first lease agreement. [R: 1848: pp. 336:20-
338:22, 341:22-342:12, 347:16-348:1, 390:18-392:17.] 
Paragraph nos. 5 and 9 of the Rental Agreement and 
paragraph nos. 2 and 7 of the Renewal Agreement expressly 
provided that it was the responsibility of the tenants to 
maintain the property in a clean condition and in a state of 
good repair: 
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5. TENANT has examined the premises and is satisfied 
with the physical condition thereof, and his/her taking 
possession is conclusive evidence of receipt of 
premises in good order and repair. Any exceptions to 
this statement are noted below. 
TENANT agrees to keep said premises in clean and 
satisfactory condition. TENANT agrees to clean and 
repair any damage upon vacating the premises. The 
security deposit will be refunded within 14 days of 
final inspection, provided that the TENANT stays six 
(6) months or longer, thirty (3 0) days written notice 
is received prior to vacating, premises are clean and 
in good condition, rent due is paid in full, and final 
payments are made on all utilities. 
9. TENANT shall maintain both inside and outside of 
the premises in a clean and orderly fashion: free of 
trash and debris, and lawns watered and mowed. TENANT 
will not keep any inoperable vehicle on the grounds. 
2. DISCOUNT PROGRAM: As an incentive to the RESIDENT 
to mail rent payments before the first of the month due 
and for being responsible for all minor maintenance and 
repairs (up to $5 0 a month) , a discount in the amount 
of $5 0 may be deducted from the above rental sum each 
month. This discount will automatically be forfeited if 
the RESIDENT fails to perform as stated above. 
7. CONDITION, MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS: RESIDENT has 
examined the premises and is satisfied with the 
physical condition thereof. His/her taking possession 
is conclusive evidence of receipt of premises in good 
order and repair, with any exceptions to this statement 
noted below. 
RESIDENT agrees to keep said premises in clean and 
satisfactory condition. RESIDENT shall maintain both 
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inside and outside of the premises in a clean and 
orderly fashion: free of trash and debris, and lawns 
watered and mowed. RESIDENT will not keep and 
inoperable vehicles on the grounds. 
[R: Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2.] Klaus Campbell read and 
understood those provisions before signing both the first 
Lease and the renewal agreement. [R: 1848: pp. 3 90:18-
392:17, 401:18-403:10.] 
Having marshaled all the evidence taken by the Trial 
Court in support of its ruling concerning the condition of 
the premises, it is apparent that there was no admissible 
evidence that the property was in a condition other than 
that specified at the commencement of the original lease, 
and subsequently at the commencement of the second year of 
the lease. Thus, there is no factual basis for any equity to 
be done in rebating rent paid by the defendants during the 
first 23 months of their occupation of the premises. 
Moreover, as pointed out at trial, these defendants 
always had an option to leave, withhold rent to make 
repairs, or take other action to redress their living 
conditions. [R: 1848: pp. 486:7-12, 489:1-491:9, 501:10-
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502:13.] Having signed the lease and having failed to take 
any such action, the defendants must be estopped from either 
claiming damages associated with an allegation that the 
premises were not as clean or as comfortable as they would 
have liked or denying their responsibility for the cleaning 
and repair upon their departure. By agreeing to the express 
provision of the lease concerning the condition of the 
premises, the defendants induced the plaintiff to sign a 
second lease with them and allow them to continue living at 
the premises. [R: Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2.] The Trial 
Court's ruling turns the provisions of the contract upside 
down. 
V, THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IS ON TRIAL IN THIS 
CASE. 
Judge Learned Hand wrote, long ago, that one of the 
primary purposes the common law in the United States is to 
provide predictability. By making sure that legal precedents 
are followed and consistently applied, the common law 
thereby gives directions to parties about who is likely to 
prevail in a legal action. When the Trial Court deviates 
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from the expressed rules of law, it eliminates the 
predictability that parties depend upon in order to bring an 
action to the Courts. A lack of predictability leads 
individuals to believe that going to trial is a xxcrap 
shoot. " That attitude also creates an opportunity for a 
party to present an unmeritorious claim or defense, 
believing there is a chance of success based on a potential 
arbitrary outcome. 
In the present case, the Trial Court's decisions, 
including the failure to award an attorney1s fees to the 
prevailing party, is an outcome that could not have been 
reasonably predicted by the plaintiff. It was undisputed 
that rent was owned for April 2 000 and June 2 00 0 under the 
express terms of the agreement. The defendants even 
testified that they were aware they owed rent for June 2000. 
[R: 1848: p. 491:1-20.] The only issue that was even 
disputed by the defendants was the condition of the 
premises, which should have been severely limited by the 
parol evidence rule and by the question of relevance. Even 
if the amount of the cleaning and repairs to the property 
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was not awarded as additional damages over and above the 
amount of the security deposit, the plaintiff anticipated 
with a certainty that she would be entitled to recover the 
rent due under the express terms of the agreement without an 
offset to the defendants for the 23 months they lived in the 
premises which were not at issue as part of the plaintiff's 
case. Particularly after all of the defendants' 
counterclaims were dismissed on summary judgment, there was 
no basis upon which the plaintiff could have expected going 
into trial that the Trial Court would award a monetary 
damage to the defendants as an offset to their legal 
obligation to pay rent for the months of June 1998 through 
May 2000. 
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing, plaintiff still 
prevailed at trial. She was awarded damages in the principal 
sum of $207.37. [R: 1629-34, 1848: 569:15-17.] And yet, 
dispite the fact that she did obtain a net recovery making 
her the prevailing party, the Trial Court still determined 
not to award attorney's fees on the basis that she had not 
prevailed enough. [R: 1629-34, 1848: pp. 567:23-568:2.] 
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The lack of predictability that would be created in 
these circumstances by failing to award attorney's fees to 
the plaintiff as the prevailing party would be an injustice 
to the plaintiff and would undermine the credibility of the 
legal system. It would indirectly reward behavior that 
increases litigiousness even where a tenant is faced with a 
certainty as a matter of law that rents are owed under an 
agreement containing an attorney's fees provision. 
As distasteful as it is going to be for the Trial Court 
to have to deal with this case any further, and with all due 
respect to the Trial Court, plaintiff believes that a bias 
was created by the circumstances of this case which led the 
Trial Court to limit the amount of repairs and cleaning to 
the exact amount of the security deposit and relieve 
plaintiff from her obligation to pay rent for the month of 
June 2000 for the primary purpose of making it possible for 
the Trial Court to avoid dealing with the attorney's fees 




Appellant respectfully requests that the Court of 
Appeals direct the Trial Court to amend its Judgment to 
a. Increase the cleaning and repair expense awarded 
to the plaintiff based on consideration of the bias created 
by the admission of irrelevant and otherwise inadmissible 
parol evidence by awarding an additional $700.00 for 
cleaning by plaintiff and $1,877.22 for repairs paid to Gus 
Dixon or order a new trial concerning these issues only; 
b. Award plaintiff rent in the amount of $1,095.00 
and a late fee in the amount of $54.75 under the terms of 
the Renewal Agreement for the June 2 000 rent and eliminate 
the award of an equitable offset as a matter of law; 
c. Identify plaintiff as the prevailing party 
entitled to costs and attorney's fees and permit plaintiff 
to submit her statement of costs and attorney's fees 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d) and 
the express terms of the contract. 
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ADDENDUM 
Per the Table of Contents, Addendum are attached 
following the signature of the Appellant and the Certificate 
of Service by mail. 
DATED this 2? day of February, 2006. 
Thor B. Roundy 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
Thor B. Roundy 
448 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 364-3229 
Bar No. 6435 
I, THOR B. ROUNDY, certify that on this 73 day of 
February, 2006, I served a copy of the attached BRIEF OF THE 
APPELLANT, Trial Court No. 000908772, Appellate Court No. 
20050660-CA, upon counsel for the appellee in this matter by 
mailing two copies to each of them by first class mail with 
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
Kevin M. Sheff 
68 South Main Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^ ^ > 
Thor B. Roundy 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Case No. 000908772 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Date: JUNE 7, 2005 
THE COURT HAS REVIEWED PLAINTIFF'S SUBMITTED FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT, (SERVICE CERTIFICATE 
5/25/05), DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS, PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE AND DENIES 
THE OBJECTIONS. 
THE COURT IS PERSUADED THAT PLAINTIFF'S SUBMITTED FINDINGS 
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT CORRECTLY AND SUCCINCTLY 
STATE THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. THE COURT NOTES THAT 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS HAVE SOME BASIS BUT THEY DO NOT ADD NOR 
CLARIFY THE SUBMITTED FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT. 
FURTHERMORE, WITH THE JUDGMENT AMOUNT AS RELATIVELY INSUBSTANTIAL 
THE COURT DOES NOT FIND THE NECESSITY TO CONDUCT ADDITIONAL 
HEARINGS ON THIS MATTER. LASTLY, THOSE PROVISIONS NOT 
SPECIFICALLY STATED BY THE COURT INCLUDED IN THE SUBMITTED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT ARE HOWEVER 
ADOPTED BY THE COURT. 
"g^ .bl 
\ I ~ 
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THE COURT SIGNED THE SUBMITTED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT ON JUNE 7, 2005. 
GKl/jmb 
\ i V7—I 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 000908772 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail THOR B ROUNDY 
ATTORNEY PLA 
448 E 400 S STE 100 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail KEVIN M SHEFF 
ATTORNEY DEF 
311 S STATE ST STE 240 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated this \ day of S^S\i,\-\_C 20 o5 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) \\n7^k 
"vifVJtO 
Thor B. Roundy (Bar No. 6435) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
448 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 364-3229 
Facsimile (801) 364-4721 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
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CLAUS CAMPBELL and SHANNON 
CAMPBELL, individuals, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000908772 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS^ 
>ATI„M1 go rtV9' 
On April 28, 2005 at 9:00 a.m., and continuing on May 10, 
2005 at 9:30 a.m., the above-captioned matter came before the 
Honorable Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki for trial. Plaintiff Geralynn 
Myrah was represented by Thor B. Roundy. Defendants Claus 
Campbell and Shannon Campbell were represented by Kevin M. Sheff. 
For good cause appearing, the Court made the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. As established by the defendants' response to Request 
for Admission no. 1, Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a 
Rental Agreement for the lease of the real property located at 
1433 Mulberry Way, Sandy, Utah (the "Premises"), dated June 9, 
1998. 
2. As established by the defendants' response to Request 
for Admission no. 2, Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a 
Renewal Agreement for the lease of the Premises, dated May 6, 
1999. 
3. Paragraph 11 of the Rental Agreement and paragraph 13 
of the Renewal Agreement contain an integration clause. 
4. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Renewal Agreement, rent 
for April 2000 was due April 1, 2000 in the amount of $1,095.00. 
Rent for June 2000 was due June 1, 2000 in the amount of 
$1,095.00. 
5. Defendants' payment for April 2000 was only $1,045.00 
and it was 7 days late. Defendants have failed to make any 
payment of rent for June 2000. 
6. Paragraph 1 of the Renewal Agreement provides for a 
late fee of $5 per day up to a maximum of 5% of the monthly rent. 
7. The late fee as to the April 2000 payment was $35.00 
and the late fee as to the June 2000 payment was $54.75. 
8. Paragraph 6 of the Rental Agreement and paragraph 9 of 
the Renewal Agreement requires Defendants to pay for utilities. 
9. Defendants' unpaid water bill through June 2000 was 
$122.37. 
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10. Paragraph 5 of the Rental Agreement and paragraph 7 of 
the Renewal Agreement state that defendants have examined the 
Premises and that they were in good order and repair at the 
commencement of each agreement. 
11. Paragraphs 5 and 9 of the Rental Agreement and 
paragraphs 2, 4 and 7 of the Renewal Agreement provide that it is 
the responsibility of the tenant to maintain the Premises in good 
repair and in a clean condition. 
12. The Premises were not unhabitable during the term of 
rental by the defendants. 
13. The condition of the Premises during the 23 months that 
they were occupied by the defendants was one of inconvenience and 
discomfort. 
14. Plaintiff incurred expenses of $332.14 in the repair 
and cleaning of the property after the property was vacated by 
the defendants for materials that were reasonable and necessary 
as a result of the occupation of the premises by the defendants. 
15. The reasonable value of the labor provided by the 
plaintiff after the defendants vacated the premises was $500, 
which labor was reasonable and necessary as a result of the 
defendants' occupation of the premises. 
16. Plaintiff incurred $1,877.18 in payments to Gus Dixon 
for repairs to the premises after the defendants vacated the 
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premises, but there was inadequate foundation provided for any of 
the work performed by Mr. Dixon. 
17. With regard to all of the wear-and-tear to the premises 
including but not limited to the damage to the linoleum that was 
replaced by the plaintiff, the Court awards the sum of $267.86 as 
the damage incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the 
defendants' occupation of the premises. 
18. The defendants paid a security deposit of $1,100.00 
with regard to their occupation of the premises. 
19. Paragraph 3 of the Rental Agreement and paragraph 11 of 
the Renewal Agreement provides for an award of costs and 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party in any legal action to 
enforce such agreements. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The relevant provisions of the agreements between the 
parties are unambiguous. The integration clause contained in each 
agreement prohibits the defendants from introducing parole 
evidence to alter the plain meaning of the agreements. 
2. Based on the plain meaning of the provisions of the 
agreements between the parties, defendants are liable for the 
following unpaid amounts: 
a. unpaid rent: $50.00 from April 1, 2000; 
b. late fees: $35.00 from April 7, 2000; and 
c. unpaid utilities: $122.37 from July 20, 2000. 
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3. Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest at the 
rate of 10 percent from the respective dates set forth above, 
totaling $98.50 as of the date of this Order. 
4. Plaintiff is entitled to damages for cleaning of 
repairs in the amount of $1,100.00, less a credit for the 
security deposit left by the defendants of $1,100.00. 
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Lease Agreement, 
defendants are entitled to an equitable offset equal to the 
amount of the rent due June 1, 2000 based on the inconvenient and 
uncomfortable condition of the premises during the 23 months that 
the defendants occupied the premises. 
6. Neither party is the prevailing party in the above-
captioned action; and not withstanding the costs and attorney's 
fee provision in the lease, no attorney1 s fees will be awarded to 
either party. 
JUDGMENT 
1. Based on the foregoing, plaintiff is awarded judgment 
against the defendants, jointly and severally, in the sum of 
$305.87 as of the date of this Order. 
2. Neither party will be awarded costs or attorney's fees 
in the above-captioned action. 
3. Defendants are also liable to pay to the plaintiff the 
sum of $270.50, pursuant to the Court's Order on April 2, 2003 
relating to the cost of the airplane ticket for the second 
deposition of Geralynn Myrah. 
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4. Plaintiff is entitled to the costs and reasonable 
attorneys fees incurred in collection of the aforesaid judgment, 
together with post-judgment interest at the prevailing legal rate 
for judgments as of the date of said Order. 
DATED this J_ day of-May, 2005. 
Judge Glenn K. Iwa 
Third District Cour 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, by United States mail, 
first-class, postage prepaid, this "zr~ day of May, 2005, to the 
following: 
Kevin M. Sheff 
ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATES 
311 South State Street, Suite 240 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Case No. 000908772 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Date: JULY 14, 2005 
THE COURT HAS REVIEWED DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED 
VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR NEW TRIAL AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDA, PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION, DEFENDANTS' REPLY AS WELL AS 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT OR FOR A NEW 
TRIAL AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT, DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION, 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY, ALL SUBMITTED AFFIDAVITS AND DENIES ALL 
MOTIONS. 
THE TRIAL IN THIS MATTER WAS CONDUCTED ON MAY 10, 2005 FOR 
ONE DAY. IN SPITE OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF MISTAKE OF LAW, BIAS, 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND INCORRECT EVIDENTIARY RULINGS, THE COURT 
IS SATISFIED, THAT THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND JUDGMENT ARE WELL-FOUNDED BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE 
A/. * &Mt c 
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PRODUCED AT TRIAL AND THERE IS NO REASON FOR THE COURT TO CHANGE 
IT'S POSITION. 
THIS SIGNED MINUTE ENTRY WILL BE THE ORDER OF THE COURT ON 
THESE ISSUES. 
DATED THIS 14TH DAY OF JULY, 2005. 
GKl/jmb 
\ *i \ 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 000908772 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail THOR B ROUNDY 
ATTORNEY PLA 
448 E 400 S STE 100 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail KEVIN M SHEFF 
ATTORNEY DEF 
311 S STATE ST STE 240 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated this \^\ day of 
Deputy Court Cl\erk 
Page 1 (last) i - I i/O 
Thor B. Roundy (Bar No. 6435) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
448 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 364-3229 
Facsimile (801) 364-4721 
nnmym m$mCJ cmr 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 7 . 2p03 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
. , Clerk * 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 








Civil No. 000908772 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Based on that hearing held May 19, 2003 before the Honorable 
Glenn K. Iwasaki, Thor B. Roundy appearing for Plaintiff and 
Kevin M. Sheff appearing for Defendants, further based on the 
pleadings of the parties, and for good cause appearing, is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. Based on the undisputed fact that the requirements of 
the Utah Fit Premises Act were not complied with by the 
Defendants, the Court concludes that as a matter of law the 
claims asserted by the Defendants are barred. Therefore, 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to the Defendants 
claims is Granted and the Defendants counterclaims in this action 
are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Based on certain disputed facts asserted by the 
Defendants, Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on 
Plaintiff's claims is hereby Denied. It is hereby Ordered that 
the disputed issues of fact remaining for trial are: 
a. whether the premises tendered to Defendants under 
the lease agreement were habitable; 
b. whether there exists a renewal agreement between 
the parties; and 
c. whether an integration clause was contained in the 
original lease and the renewal agreement. 
Dated this ^ day of August, 2003. 
Myrah-ORDER 2 v \ / V O 
As approved as to form: 
Kevin M. Sheff 
Attorney for Defendants 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Amended Order, by United States 
mail, first class, postage prepaid, this j$ day of August, 
2003, to the following: 
Kevin M. Sheff 
ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATES 
311 South State Street, Suite 






Received from & U l < S A A ) E > <3W4lOA)fr \ l Q f t f r f i P R E Z / 
hereinafter called TENANT, the following sums: 
Received on: Payable by: 
Security deposit ' %\.DOb<6Q % 
Utility deposit $ J 
Petdeposit \\V% I (&T $ \bO,U& $ 
for the rental of the single family dwelling located at: - ^ ,
 A —> 
TERMS OF RENTAL 
1. Geralynn V. Myrah, hereinafter referred to as OWNER, does let to TENANT the property described 
above for the term of \ V^kfL . starting on the jgHu daypf c f i / / \ f e left's 
and ending on the fife ^ dav of <y) [A\P tft APy . The monthly rental is ^ I hR& 
due and payable in advance on the first day of each month. At the expiration of the original term, 
this agreement shall renew on a month-to-month basis at a rent of 110% of the monthly rental 
stated above, until a new (ease agreement is signed or either party gives the other thirty (30) 
days written notice. 
The TENANT agrees to pay the OWNER or the OWNER'S AGENT the monthly rental in full on or 
before the first of every month. Time is of the essence in this agreement Rent postmarked 
after the first of the month will only be accepted with a late fee of $5 per day lata 
If the TENANT fails to pay rent or late fees due, or violates any other term of this agreement, OWNER 
or OWNER'S AGENT shall have the right to re-enter the premises and terminate the agreement 
and dispose of any personal property left by the TENANT. Such re-entry shall not bar the 
right of recovery of rent or damage for breach of covenants, nor shall the receipt of rent after 
violation of this agreement be deemed a waiver or forfeiture. 
2. The premises are rented for the occupancy of J*) children and dL adults. It is 
expressly understood that this agreement is between OWNER and each signatory individually 
and severally. In the event of a default by one signatory, each and every remaining signatory 
shall be responsible for timely payment of rent and all other provisions of this agreement. 
3. If OWNER should be compelled to file or sustain legal action to collect rent due or part thereof, 
or for damages, cleaning, repairs, utilities or to dispossess the agreement or to recover possession 
of premises, TENANT shall pay all costs in connection therewith, including travel and legal fees. 
4. It is mutually understood and agreed that the OWNER and the OWNERS AGENT shall have 
access to the premises at alJ reasonable times. 
5. TENANT has examined the premises and is satisfied with the physical condition thereof, and 
his/her taking possession is conclusive evidence of receipt of premises in good order and 
repair. Any exceptions to this statement are noted betow. 
TENANT agrees to keep said premises in clean and satisfactory condition. TENANT agrees 
to clean and repair any damage upon vacating the premises. The security deposit will be 
refunded within 14 days of final inspection, provided that the TENANT stays six (6) months or 
longer, thirty (30) days written notice is thirty (30) days written notice is received prior to vacating, 
premises are clean and in good condition, rent due is paid in full, and final payments are made 
on all utilities. 
6. TENANT is responsible for paying all utilities and services, induding, but not limited to, power, 
gas, water, garbage, sewer, snow removal, yard maintenance, cable and telephone. 
TENANT agrees to put all utilities in his/her name by the effective date of the rental. In such 
cases as OWNER must retain some utility in her own name, TENANT shall pay a deposit 
equivalent to the estimated monthly charge for said utility, to be refunded after payment in full 
of the final utility bill, rents due and cleaning charges. 
7. TENANT shall report all damage and repair requirements to OWNER OWNER will arrange 
and pay for all repairs. TENANT is not authorized to contract or pay for repairs on behalf of 
the OWNER. Any work arranged and paid for by TENANT may not be deducted from the rent 
or reimbursed by OWNER without written agreement. 
8. TENANT shall not permit any unlawful practise to be committed on the premises. TENANT shall 
not sublet the premises or any part thereof, or transfer or assign this lease without written consent 
of the OWNER. TENANT shall not keep or maintain any pot on the promises. 
9 TENANT shall maintain both inside and outside of the premises in a dean and orderly fashion: 
free of trash and debris, and lawns watered and mowed. TENANT will not keep any inoperable 
vehicles on the grounds. 
10. OWNER will insure the risk of loss to the premises only, and assumes no liability for TENANTS 
personal property. It is expressly agreed and understood that the OWNER shall not be liable for 
any damage or injury to any property, TENANT, visitor, or employee occurring on the premises. 
TENANT agrees to hold owner harmless from any daims for damages, no matter how caused. 
11. The above terms and conditions constitute the only terms and conditions of this agreement 
and may be modified only in writing, which is signed by both parties. 
MODIFICATIONS TO AGREEMENT 
The undersigned TBJANT7S) hereby agree to the terms and conditions. 
wffi^fis? jamd^^ 
(^-//O^Tmi RENT TO: 
DATE ''CGERALYNN MYRAH 
826 TICONDEROGA DRIVE 
SUNNYVALE, CA 94087 




AJift L .\<M 
ERTY ADDRESS l 4 3 3 fl) ULftgRftY [OJ
 f ^4^)n / 
NTS' NAMES R i - f t U ^ * g W ^ f J A U <*./WnPflP7/ 
ity deposit on file 
»Posit on file tDf t f i
 T I OAT 
deposit on file $Uft6 
TERMS OF RENTAL 
RENT: Rent shall be $ /P96 per month,, payable in advance on the first day of each 
calendar month to Geralynn V. Myrah, 826 Ticonderoga Drive, Sunnyvale, CA 94087. If rent 
is not postmarked by the 3rd of the month a late charge of $5 per day will be assessed 
to a maximum of 5% of the rent. 
DISCOUNT PROGRAM: As an incentive to the RESIDENT to mail rent payments before 
the first of the month due and for being responsible for all minor maintenance and repairs 
(up to $50 a month), a discount in the amount of $ St> may be deducted from 
the above rental sum each month. This discount will automatically be forfeited if the 
RESIDENT fails to perform as stated above. 
TERM OF AGREEMENT: This agreement i s ^ L E A S ^ u l j 11H |>MUHT1 I. 
The term of this agreement shall commence on r r u i V 1 » 1Q*?9 and end on 
CTPklfj SO^LhNs unless terminated sooner as herein provided. OWNER will 
provide 30 days written notice to RESIDENT at the end of anyjease. Any offer to renew 
the lease is at the option of the OWNER and will be included with the 30 day notice. If 
RESIDENT fails to return the signed lease renewal and does not provide 30 days written 
notice of intent to vacate, this agreement wll automatically renew on a month-to-month 
basis at a rent of %12J>0 until 3Q days written notice ottermination is given by either party. 
If RESIDENT desires to terminate the lease at any time after the first 120 days of the term, but 
prior to the end of said term, the following is required: 
1. 30 days written notice is provided to OWNER. 
2. All rents and charges are paid through the date of termination. 
3. Termination fee of 1 1/2 month's rent is paid in full. 
4. Premises are left in good, clean condition, with no damage. 
5. All other terms of this agreement are complied with. 
SECURITY DEPOSIT: The security deposit set forth above shall secure the performance of 
RESIDENTS obligations. Refund of security deposit is dependent upon RESIDENT fulfilling 
ail of the following conditions: 
1. RESIDENT has-pravideda written thirty (30) day nntipe to OWNER prior to the 
date of termination or expiration. 
2. RESIDENT has no other moneys due. 
3. RESIDENT has thoroughly cleaned the premises, appliances and fixtures. 
U n _ t l 
4. RESIDENT and all other individuals using the premises have surrendered the 
premises to the OWNER, all keys are turned in to the OWNER. 
5. RESIDENT supplies the OWNER with a forwarding address, in writing, to which 
the security deposit refund may be sent 
RESIDENT shall not have the right to apply the security deposit in payment of last month's rent. 
USE: The premises are rented for the occupancy of < H children and J2 adults. It is 
expressly understood that this agreement is between OWNER and each signatory individually 
and severally. In the event of a default by one signatory, each and every remaining signatory o 
shall be responsible for timely payment of rent and all other provisions of this agreement. 
RESIDENT shall not sublet the premises or any part thereof, or transfer or assign this lease 4 
without the written consent of the OWNER. 
RESIDENT shall not keep or maintain any pet on the premises without written permission. 
ENTRY AND INSPECTION: RESIDENT shall permit OWNER or OWNER'S AGENT to enter 
the premises at all reasonable times and upon reasonable notice. 
CONDITION, MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS: RESIDENT has examined the premises 
and is satisfied with the physical condition thereof. His/her taking possession is conclusive 
evidence of receipt of premises in good order and repair, with any exceptions to this statement 
noted below. 
RESIDENT agrees to keep.satd.pmmisfts in clean and satisfactory condition. RESIDENT 
shall maintain both inside and outside of the premises in a clean and orderly fashion: free of 
trash and debris, and lawns watered and mowed RESIDFNT wll not keep any inoperable 
vehicles on the grounds. ' 
REPAIR POLICY: The RESIDENT hereby acknowledges that they: have been informed that 
OWNER and/or his agents are not alvs«ys available to provide support services to RESIDENTS. 
The rental discount is nff^rpH for this reason: tn enmiirage R F S I P F N T S \n take care of themselves 
and the property. If a problem comes up that costs $50 or more to repair, then the RESIDENT 
must contact the OWNER onagent as soon as prissiNe and ntftain written authorization 
prior to making the repair or improvement. Under no circumstances will the OWNER be 
responsible for anyjmprovementsxfccepairs casting more than $5p unless OWNER provides 
RESIDENT with advance written authorization to make a repair or improvement. 
UTILITIES: RESIDENT is rAspnnsihte for paying all i itiiifiAQ anH cormrac including, but not 
limited to gas, water, garbage, sewer, snow removal, yard maintenance, cable and telephone. 
RESIDENT agrees to put alLutilitiesiahis/her name hy fhp pffpnfivft^late of the rental. In such 
cases as OWNER must retain some utility in her own name, OWNER will forward the bill 
to RESIDENT and RESIDENT will promptly pay said bill. 
LIABILITY: OWNER will insure the risk of loss to the premises only, and assumes no liability for 
RESIDENTS personal pmpgrty it is pypressiy agram anrf
 t ir^fycfrwi that the OWNER shall 
not be liable for any damage or injury to any property, RESIDENT, visitor, or employee 
occurring on the premises . RESIDENT agrees tn hold owner harmless from any claims few-
damages, no matter how caused. 
VIOLATION OF AGREEMENT: if P F ^ I H P M T fa»ic t 0 pg^rf>nt or late fees due, or 
violates any other term of this agreement, OWNER or agent shall have the right to re-enter 
the premises and terminate the aprframfrnt and dkpr*^
 0 f flny piysmal property left by the 
RESIDENT. Such re-entry shall not bar the right of recovery of rent and damages for breach of 
*~t 
covenants, nor shall the receipt of rent after violation of this agreement be deemed a waiver 
or forfeiture. 
If OWNER should be compelled to file or sustain i^pai arfinn to ^|o^tjront due o r part thereof, 
or for damages, cleaning, repairs, utilities or to dispossess the agreement or to recover possession 
of premises, RESIDENT shall pay all nnsfs in mnnftrtinn thftm\Mth including travel and legal fees. 
TIME: Time is of the essence for this agreement. 
ENTIRE AGREEMENT: The ahnx/ft terms and mnriitinnQ mnotittite th^ nn |y terms and conditions 
of this agreement and may be modified only in writing, which is signed by both parties. 
lit* 
MODIFICATIONS TO AGREEMENT 
L*. 






OWNER OR AGENT 
MAIL RENT TO: 
GERALYNN MYRAH 
82$ TICONDEROGA DRIVE 
SUNNYVALE, CA 94087 
408-245-2564 
530-582-7089 
email: geralynn@jps.net 
fax: 603-375-5385 
DATE 
